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ABSTRACT
This Article traces the history and evolution of corporate responsibility
under international law to contextualize the developing discourse on busi-
ness and human rights. It explores the role of private industry in contribut-
ing to colonial expansion, slavery, and conflict, and examines the advocacy
efforts of abolitionists, anti-imperialism activists, and peace movements to
craft reforms and create norms to control corporate conduct. First, the Ar-
ticle outlines the challenge that regulating private commercial power
presents for a system of public international law premised on the sovereign
power of states. Then, using the example of colonial era European charter
companies the Article offers a critical evaluation of the limitations of inter-
national law for defining the social role of a corporation in society and its
broader responsibilities to the public in light of the legacy of empire and
exploitation. Finally, the Article will explain how the contemporary move-
ment to recognize a corporate responsibility to respect human rights under
international law builds upon these precedents of post-colonial and post-
conflict accountability efforts and competing concepts of international legal
personality. This paper argues that the scope and nature of corporate
human rights responsibilities must be proportionate and informed by an
appreciation for the changing role of the place of private industry in inter-
national relations over the course of time.
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The function of international law is to provide a legal basis for the
orderly management of international relations. The traditional nature of
that law was keyed to the actualities of past centuries in which international
relations were interstate relations. The actualities have changed . . . .1
—Philip C. Jessup, American International Legal Scholar (1947)
1. PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 16 (1948).
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The rise of the modern corporation has brought a concentration of
economic power which can compete on equal terms with the modern
state . . . .2
—Adolf A. Berle, American Corporate Legal Scholar (1934)
INTRODUCTION: ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR INJUSTICES ABROAD
Esther Kiobel’s efforts to obtain compensation from corporations that
were allegedly complicit in the demise of her late husband, an environ-
mentalist working to oppose excesses of the extractives industry in Nigeria,
ended when the United States Supreme Court declined to exercise jurisdic-
tion over her claims.3 Along with other Nigerian nationals, Kiobel sued the
Dutch company Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, the English company
Shell Transport and Trading Company, and their joint subsidiary Shell Pe-
troleum Development Company of Nigeria.4 She claimed that these corpo-
rations had “violated the law of nations by aiding and abetting the Nigerian
Government in committing (1) extrajudicial killings; (2) crimes against hu-
manity; (3) torture and cruel treatment; (4) arbitrary arrest and detention;
(5) violations of the rights to life, liberty, security, and association; (6)
forced exile; and (7) property destruction.”5 She sought relief under cus-
tomary international law for these violations and filed her suit in the United
States.6
Kiobel was originally from Ogoniland, a small area in the oil rich Ni-
ger Delta region of Nigeria. The foreign corporations she sued were all
engaged in oil exploration and production in the region at the time of her
husband’s death and the alleged abuses. Members of her Ogoni community,
concerned about the environmental impacts of businesses operating in the
region, protested the practices of the corporations by engaging in acts of
civil disobedience and disrupting business. Resistance by the Ogoni com-
munity compromised the ability of businesses to conduct business.  Busi-
nesses called on public authorities to put an end to community protests.
The Nigerian government, a military dictatorship at the time, obliged
the interests of private industry and took action to restore order to the re-
gion. Later, investigations would reveal the government’s actions were ex-
cessive.7 Peaceful protests in Ogoniland were violently repressed by
2. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 357 (1934).
3. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
4. Id. at 1662.
5. Id. at 1663.
6. Id.
7. Paul Lewis, Blood and Oil: A Special Report; After Nigeria Represses, Shell Defends Its
Record, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1996 (“To crush the unrest by the Ogoni, who complained of envi-
ronmental damage to their territories and demanded money for the oil extracted there, Nigeria sent
its notoriously brutal ‘mobile police’ and mounted a campaign of repression that included laying
waste to whole villages.”).
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Nigeria’s military dictatorship.8 The Nigerian government’s retaliation
caused great suffering and extended to several communities in Ogoniland.9
Kiobel alleged “military and police forces attacked Ogoni villages, beating,
raping, killing, and arresting residents and destroying or looting
property.”10
Kiobel claimed that the death of her husband and the atrocities suf-
fered by residents of the region at the hands of Nigeria’s military dictator-
ship were in fact aided and abetted by extractive industry corporations
operating in Ogoniland. She alleged that the corporations named in her
complaint supported the Nigerian government’s violent suppression of pro-
tests by, among other things, allegedly providing “food, transportation, and
compensation, as well as by allowing the Nigerian military to use respon-
dents’ property as a staging ground for attacks.”11
Kiobel escaped abuses in Nigeria. She sought and was granted political
asylum in the United States.12 Based on the past injustices she suffered,
seeking access to justice in Nigeria was unappealing and unlikely. Instead,
Kiobel, a foreign national, brought her suit against foreign companies for
abuses that had occurred in a foreign country in the United States under the
Alien Tort Statute (ATS).13 Part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the ATS
provides: “the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.”14
The Second Circuit dismissed Kiobel’s suit, reasoning that the law of
nations does not recognize corporate liability.15 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to consider that question. However, the Court also
directed the parties to address an additional question: “whether and under
8. Id.
9. Howard W. French, Nigeria Executes Critic of Regime; Nations Protest, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 1995 (“When the movement’s members began to demonstrate for an end to oil spillages
by Royal Dutch/Shell and for a share of the revenues from the oil pumped from their land, interna-
tional human rights groups say, Nigerian troops began mounting a kind of scorched-earth cam-
paign against the Ogoni, burning villages and committing murders and rapes.”).
10. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662.
11. Id. at 1663.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004), the
Court determined that the ATS did not expressly provide for any causes of action but only granted
jurisdiction. This jurisdiction is best understood as limited by common law to provide “a cause of
action for the modest number of international law violations . . . .” Id. at 724. Kiobel places a
further limit on the jurisdictional grant restricting to conduct on U.S. territory. In concurrence,
Justice Breyer notes the presumption against extraterritoriality could potentially be overcome
when conduct at issue “substantially and adversely affects an important American national inter-
est . . . .” Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring). In Justice Breyer’s view it is in the
American national interest to “prevent[ ] the United States from becoming a safe harbor . . . for a
torturer or other common enemy of mankind” and not allow such enemies to evade the risks of
civil or criminal liability. Id.
15. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 149 (2d Cir. 2010).
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what circumstances courts may recognize a cause of action under the [Alien
Tort Statute], for violations of the law of nations occurring within the terri-
tory of a sovereign other than the United States.”16
The Court did not state a position on whether or not it would be possi-
ble for a corporation to violate the law of nations or to be liable for such
violations. Rather, the Court concluded that the extension of jurisdiction
over claims that occurred overseas, such as those made by Kiobel, would
run counter to a longstanding and powerful presumption against extraterri-
torial application of U.S. laws.17 The presumption operates to ensure the
judiciary acts with caution where foreign policy concerns may be impli-
cated were a court to craft a remedy. The presumption, as the Court ex-
plained, “serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and
those of other nations which could result in international discord.”18 This
strong historical presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S.
law compelled the Court to refuse to entertain Kiobel’s allegations of atroc-
ities. Because the events occurred outside the United States, Kiobel’s alle-
gations that private corporate actors were complicit in conduct in violation
of the law of nations were deemed beyond the reach of U.S. court jurisdic-
tion.19 As the presumption against extraterritoriality articulated in the Ki-
obel decision stands, the principle further limits the forums available to
victims of international human rights violations to access a remedy for
abuses suffered by foreclosing the United States as a forum for seeking
relief unless claims stated are deemed to sufficiently “touch and concern”
the United States.
Kiobel’s case was but one of many filed in the United States that
framed corporate actors as complicit in human rights abuses. In the past
decade, human rights activists brought several ATS suits seeking remedy on
behalf of victims for rights violations that occurred inside foreign countries.
The countries that have attracted the attention of international human rights
lawyers for alleged atrocities involving private corporate actors share strik-
ingly common features: a brutal colonial past and a present plagued by cor-
ruption. Several of the most controversial ATS cases have involved major
multinational corporations operating in developing countries that were pre-
viously governed under European colonial rule. Exxon Mobil was sued for
abuses in Indonesia.20 Dow Chemical Company was sued for injuries sus-
tained by Vietnamese nationals in Vietnam.21 Coca-Cola was sued for
abuses in Columbia.22 Del Monte was sued for abuses in Guatemala.23 At
16. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1660.
17. Id. at 1668.
18. Id. at 1661 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
19. Id. at 1669.
20. See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 473 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
21. See Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104 (2d
Cir. 2008).
22. See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
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various points throughout history large portions of Africa, Asia, and the
Americas were under European colonial control.24 Countries in Africa,
Asia, and the Americas were often a source of ATS litigation activity.
Commerce played a central role in the colonial confrontation. Coloni-
alism served to shape both the evolution of corporate structure and interna-
tional legal standards. In today’s global economy, the governance of
corporations with global operations remains a central challenge due in sig-
nificant part to structures and standards that have not adequately adapted to
the realities of the current era of economic globalization. Indeed, some large
multinational corporations possess a global influence to rival that of some
countries.25 Yet, global governance is lagging behind commercial develop-
ments. Conventional approaches to international law, the usual lens through
which problems that cross borders are regarded, has so far been inadequate
to address rights abuses where private commercial actors are implicated.
Public international law has conventionally concerned issues that arise be-
tween different countries, not private commercial actors.
Given the global nature of commerce and the Supreme Court’s current
lack of enthusiasm for extending jurisdiction to adjudicate abuses that occur
abroad, it is imperative that the role of private commercial actors in public
international affairs be further examined and better understood. The law and
economics of empire building and territorial expansion during the age of
imperialism are instructive for understanding the contemporary context of
the questions raised in ATS litigation and the answers now offered in devel-
oping international standards to guide business practices where human
rights are placed at risk. At the core of cases brought against businesses for
human rights violations are crucial substantive questions: What is the role
of the corporation in international law? What is its relationship to the state?
What are its obligations with respect to people on this planet?
This Article traces the development of the enterprise of empire build-
ing in the era of colonial expansion and tracks significant changes in corpo-
23. See Villeda Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 578 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir.
2009).
24. For discussions of European colonial expansion in different parts of the globe, see gener-
ally NIALL FERGUSON, CIVILIZATION: THE WEST AND THE REST (2011); NIALL FERGUSON, EMPIRE:
THE RISE AND DEMISE OF THE BRITISH WORLD ORDER AND THE LESSONS FOR GLOBAL POWER
(2004); ANTHONY PAGDEN, PEOPLES AND EMPIRES: A SHORT HISTORY OF EUROPEAN MIGRATION,
EXPLORATION, AND CONQUEST, FROM GREECE TO THE PRESENT (2001); ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING
LEOPOLD’S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR, AND HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA (1999)
(discussing colonial control in the Belgian Congo). For discussions of the consequences of coloni-
alism and the rise of objections to imperialism, see generally SANKAR MUTHU, ENLIGHTENMENT
AGAINST EMPIRE (2003); EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (1979); FRANZ FANON, THE WRETCHED
OF THE EARTH (1963).
25. Several examples exist of large multinational corporations exhibiting power in the politi-
cal arena. See, e.g., In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (S.D. Fla. 2011)
(finding that Chiquita Banana, one of the largest banana producers worldwide, paid a Colombian
paramilitary group for over seven years in order to gain security and control over banana-growing
regions).
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rate structure and the relationship of corporate power to state sovereignty.
To show how attitudes toward the role of business in society have evolved,
this Article also maps humanitarian social movements of the past as precur-
sors to efforts to seek corporate accountability for rights abuses in the pre-
sent day.
Part I examines the debates over legal personality in international law
to enhance the evolving understanding of the nature and character of the
corporate person and assess whether corporate persons can be said to pos-
sess rights and responsibilities comparable to that of a sovereign state. Part
II explores the evolution of the corporate form through the business of em-
pire building during the age of imperialism and the role of private commer-
cial actors in creating core doctrines of international law. Finally, Part III
explains the recent efforts to incorporate human rights into business prac-
tice. By drawing parallels between the impact of social protests to oppose
corporate excesses in overseas territories and the ascendance of a humanita-
rian impulse to eradicate the trans-Atlantic trade of the past and efforts by
activists to address labor rights abuses and the excesses that have come to
be associated with economic globalization in the modern era. Ultimately,
this Article posits that global business would be well served by incorporat-
ing rights concerns into the way commerce is conducted.
I. THE POSITION OF THE “PERSON” IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law, alternatively the law of nations, has conventionally
been understood as the body of law that governs relations between nations.
Now more than ever, however, relations between nations are also influ-
enced by the actions of entities that are not nations—private citizens and
private corporations. Relations across nations are not limited to interactions
among governments and exchanges between the world capitals. Today, cap-
ital and information flow across borders and individuals cross borders seek-
ing freedom and opportunity. Corporations and citizens are increasingly
engaged in international relations. Core organizing concepts of the disci-
pline make it difficult for international law to address these new non-state
actors operating across nations because by definition the operative concepts
of the law of nations does not appear to clearly capture entities that are not
nations. The concepts of international legal personality and state sover-
eignty as they have come to inform understandings of which entities are
proper subjects of international law are examined below.
A. Duality by Definition: Public Subjects and Private Objects
As the influential international jurist Philip Jessup explained in his cel-
ebrated 1947 article, the Subjects of a Modern Law of Nations,
“[i]nternational law is generally defined or described as law applicable to
relations between states. States are said to be the subjects of international
924 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:4
law and individuals only its ‘objects.’”26 Public international law regulates
the actions of the “subjects” of international law, those entities that possess
“legal personality.”27 A subject “can affect and be affected by international
law and can enforce international law by bringing at least some interna-
tional claims.”28
A subject of international law is defined as an entity that possesses
international rights and international obligations.29 A subject must also pos-
sess the capacity to protect its rights by bringing international claims
against other subjects and the capacity to meet its international obliga-
tions.30 Objects of international law, as distinct from subjects, exist and are
acknowledged but do not enjoy the same powers of subjects or the same
status as legal persons under international law.31
Historically, international law has drawn a sharp distinction between
the subjects of international law with rights and responsibilities, and mere
objects, presumably without rights or responsibilities. As Emeka Duruigbo
has explained: “The object-subject distinction can be likened to the game of
chess in which the objects are the chessmen on the chessboard and the sub-
jects are the chess players.”32 Under this view, power resided with subjects
while objects must submit to the power or will of the subject.
Sovereign states are “subjects” of international law and possess legal
personality. However, the growing power and influence of corporate actors
have caused some commentators to call into question the distinction be-
tween subjects and objects. The question asked, but left unanswered, by the
Kiobel Court concerning whether corporations can be liable for violations
of the law of nations is complicated by the doctrinal distinction between
subjects and objects, sovereign and private power.
B. Legal Personality: Sovereign Powers and Privileges
The sovereign state enjoys status as a “legal person” in international
law.33 As sovereigns, with legal personality, states have the power to enter
into legal relationships and possess legal rights and duties. Enjoying status
26. Philip C. Jessup, The Subjects of a Modern Law of Nations, 45 MICH. L. REV. 383, 383
(1947).
27. Jose E. Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?, 9 SANTA CLARA J.
INT’L L. 1, 7 (2011).
28. Id. at 3.
29. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (5th ed. 1998).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 66–67; see also BARRY E. CARTER & ALLEN S. WEINER, INTERNATIONAL LAW
429–30 (6th ed. 2011).
32. Emeka Duruigbo, Corporate Accountability and Liability for International Human Rights
Abuses: Recent Changes and Recurring Challenges, 6 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 222, 226 n.26
(2008) (citing Sigmund Timberg, International Combines and National Sovereigns, 95 U. PA. L.
REV. 575, 576 n.4 (1947)).
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 206
(1987).
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as a legal person entitles states to act with legal capacity and to take certain
types of action in the international arena.34 For example, as legal persons,
states possess power to: (1) “own, acquire, and transfer property;” (2)
“make contracts and enter into international agreements;” (3) “become a
member of international organizations;” and (4) “to pursue, and be subject
to, legal remedies.”35
In addition to the sovereign power to exercise authority over its terri-
tory and population, a state has the capacity to make international law in
cooperation with other states either through entering into treaty agreements
or through establishing patterns of practice over time that in turn form the
body of customary international law.
1. States as Sole Subjects
Under the conventional view the only subjects of international law are
states. Because states alone had enjoyed the capacity to make claims and
were granted privileges and immunities from other national jurisdictions,
states alone merit recognition as subjects.
The constituent characteristics for formal recognition as a nation state
as set forth in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of
States are: (1) a defined territory; (2) a permanent population; (3) a govern-
ment; and (4) the capacity to conduct international relations.36 For an entity
to be eligible for recognition as a state by the international community it
must meet the criteria set forth in the Convention. A state possesses both
sovereignty and legal personality.
International law accords a partial legal personality to certain non-state
entities such as international organizations and in statu nascendi aspirant
states.37 In 1949, the International Court of Justice recognized that an inter-
national organization could possess the requisite personality to be regarded
a subject of international law.38 To merit status, an international organiza-
tion should be a permanent association created to attain certain specific
objectives. It must have administrative organs that exercise power distinct
from sovereign power of its member states. Finally, an organization must be
able to operate on a level different and distinct from national systems of
order.
34. Mala Tabory, The Legal Personality of the Palestinian Autonomy, in NEW POLITICAL
ENTITIES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PALES-
TINIAN ENTITY 139, 140 (Amos Shapira & Mala Tabory eds., 1999) (citing D.P. O’CONNELL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (2d ed. 1970)).
35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 206
(1987).
36. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S.
19, 49 Stat. 3097.
37. Tabory, supra note 34.
38. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion,
1949 I.C.J. 174, 179 (Apr. 11) [hereinafter Reparation Case].
926 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:4
2. Economic Enterprises as an Emerging “Other”
Sovereign states are by definition the uncontested subjects of interna-
tional law. Other entities that operate internationally are considered objects
of international law. Private commercial enterprises are only objects, not
subjects of international law. Yet, states are not the only actors in the inter-
national arena that place human rights at risk. The emergence of ATS ac-
tions against corporations demonstrates that certain kinds of corporate
conduct that adversely impacts the enjoyment of internationally recognized
human rights will attract the attention of rights activists and result in public
condemnation.
Nearly half of the world’s largest economic entities are corporations,
not countries.39 Today, only one thousand businesses constitute half of the
total market value of the world’s sixty thousand public companies.40
Commercial enterprises have relative clout in the international arena
and revenues that often eclipse the GDPs of sovereign states in which they
operate. Nevertheless, as Philip Jessup has observed: “International law . . .
is accustomed to dealing with corporations as ‘citizens’ or ‘nationals’ of
states in the same way in which it deals with natural persons. So long as
national law creates these juristic persons, international law must deal with
them as individuals.”41
However, conceptual complications arise when treating juristic per-
sons and natural persons alike for the purpose of determining the presence
or absence of international legal personality and delineating associated
rights and responsibilities under international law. For example, “a corpora-
tion may be created under the law of State A, may have its principle place
of business in State B, may have directors who are nationals of State C and
stockholders who are nationals of State D.”42 A natural person, in contrast,
is usually present in one place at one time and might at most have dual
citizenship.
C. Competing Accounts of Corporate Personhood and Power
The growing power and influence of private actors operating interna-
tionally present a conceptual challenge for international law because the
discipline does not have adequate concepts with which to regulate private
39. Corporate Clout 2013: Time for Responsible Capitalism, GLOBAL TRENDS, http://www
.globaltrends.com/knowledge-center/features/shapers-and-influencers (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
40. Robert G. Eccles & George Serafeim, The Performance Frontier: Innovating for a Sus-
tainable Strategy, HARV. BUS. REV., May 2013, at 50–60.
41. Jessup, supra note 26, at 387.
42. Id. at 387–88 (citing Sigmund Timberg, Corporate Fictions: Logical, Social and Interna-
tional Implications, 46 COLO. L. REV. 533, 572 (1946)); see also Detlev F. Vagts, The Multina-
tional Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 83 HARV. L. REV. 739, 741 (1970)
(explaining with respect to multinational corporations that “the present legal framework has no
comfortable, tidy receptacle for such an institution.”).
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aggregations of power. Given the duality of the subject/object distinction no
matter how powerful modern multinational corporations become they are
by definition not states and therefore are not subject to the same legal obli-
gations and duties of sovereign states. Increasingly, international legal aca-
demics are questioning the utility of the subject/object distinction and the
limited definition of international legal personality.43
Opinion is divided over the nature of the personality of corporate enti-
ties for purposes of delineating what rights and responsibilities these non-
state actors possess under public international law. Assessing the responsi-
bilities of business enterprises with respect to international human rights
arguably turns in some measure on a determination of legal personality.
Jose Alvarez argues that the obsession over subjects and objects in interna-
tional law has proved an impediment to “addressing the truly urgent ques-
tions raised by international corporate activity.”44
There are competing views on how to address the conceptual problems
presented by offering an account of international legal personality. The sub-
ject/object distinction is increasingly difficult to navigate due to complica-
tions presented by the nature of the personality of the corporate person. The
range of views in the literature on whether corporations possess the requi-
site international legal personality to assume responsibility for rights viola-
tions is varied. Legal positivists argue that corporations do not possess
international legal personality while more progressive approaches assert
that corporations do possess international legal personality by virtue of their
position in the international arena. Both positions are explained below.
1. The Positivist Perspective
Positivist jurisprudence in international law is premised on the notion
of primacy of the state. Despite later efforts to reform foundations of inter-
national law in the post-WWII period, the positivist position continues to
operate. Positivism replaced naturalism as core of the discipline offering a
new analytic with which to account for geopolitical events. Principally, pos-
itivism served to support universal application of law globally, primarily to
introduce a consistent and predictable legal framework in unoccupied areas
of Asia, Africa, and the Americas, thus easing the colonial enterprise.45
For a positivist, “the only real subjects or persons in international law
are states and their creations, namely organizations consisting of states as
members such as those of the U.N. system.”46 Under the view that states are
the only subjects of international law, “it is only through an exercise of
43. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 27.
44. Id. at 31.
45. See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2005) (examining the different phases of colonialism and its impact on the formation of
international law and sovereignty).
46. Alvarez, supra note 27, at 8.
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[state] will, as expressed through treaty or agreement or as laid down by an
international authority deriving its power from states that a rule of law be-
comes binding . . . .”47
For instance, some European commentators, such as James Crawford
and Christopher Greenwood, have advanced the positivist position that be-
cause corporations have not generally been found liable under international
law they are not therefore subject to it.48 Similarly, Janet McLean has ob-
served, “no matter how powerful transnational corporations may become,
they are not states and should not be subjected to the same legal obligations
and duties as states.”49
2. The Pragmatist Perspective
Early writers, critical of a positivist position, called into question creat-
ing a body of law that would be concerned primarily with the characteristics
of the fictitious juridical person of the state and the dogma of the subject/
object distinction drawn in international law. For example, Jessup points to
the 1928 writings of Politis indicating an appreciation for the conceptual
instability of a sovereignty assumed to encompass an all-powerful state as
the only entity from which power could be granted to other entities:
Formerly the sovereign State was an iron cage for its citizens
from which they were obliged to communicate with the outside
world, in a legal sense, through very close-set bars. Yielding to
the logic of events, the bars are beginning to open. The cage is
becoming shaky and will finally collapse. Men will then be able
to hold free and untrammeled communication with each other
across their respective frontiers.50
More contemporary commentators unsatisfied with a positivist account of
the proper subjects of international law have advanced the position that pri-
vate actors should be seen as subjects.
In a departure from the positivist position articulated by Crawford,
Greenwood, and others, American academics Dunoff, Ratner, and
Wippman present the argument that it is unreasonable to exempt private
commercial enterprise from an extension of legal personality.51 They em-
phasize that since the days of the Dutch East India Company, corporations
have operated beyond the borders of their states of incorporation and have
influenced the substance of international law in the areas of trade, invest-
47. JESSUP, supra note 1, at 17.
48. Alvarez, supra note 27, at 3.
49. Janet McLean, The Transnational Corporation in History: Lessons for Today?, 79 IND.
L.J. 363, 363 (2004).
50. Jessup, supra note 26, at 383–84 (citing POLITIS, THE NEW ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 30–31 (1928)).
51. Alvarez, supra note 27, at 5.
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ment, telecommunications, intellectual property, and antitrust.52 Indeed,
corporations have been “indirect claimants in the World Trade Organization
(WTO) dispute settlement system and direct claimants in investor-state ar-
bitration.”53 State governments have included private commercial actors in
state delegations to international organizations and forums that set global
standards.54 International organizations have included corporate partici-
pants.55 The International Labor Organization has granted private commer-
cial actors direct voting rights.56 Corporations “have played standard-setting
roles in other organizations like the International Telecommunications
Union.”57 International treaties regulating environmental protection and la-
bor conditions encompass private commercial actors de facto, if not de
jure.58 Corporations have been regulated directly by United Nations Secur-
ity Council decisions.59 Sanctions regimes implicated private commercial
actors.60 Corporations have endorsed international codes of conduct to reg-
ulate industry.61 Progressives look to the power exerted by an entity.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. For example, members of various industries have accompanied governments to United
Nations assemblies. See, e.g., Urmi A. Goswami, 12 companies designated as ‘Business Partners’
for UN Climate Summit, THE ECON. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2013, http://articles.economictimes.india
times.com/2013-09-21/news/42272647_1_climate-change-un-climate-summit-12-companies (dis-
cussing Poland’s partnership with various companies, including BMW and Polish Airlines, in
organizing UN-sponsored climate change negotiations); Katy Bachman, Google, Tech Companies
Take Action to Preserve Internet at U.N. Treaty Talks, ADWEEK, Nov. 27, 2012, http://www.ad
week.com/news/technology/google-tech-companies-take-action-preserve-internet-un-treaty-talks-
145456 (listing internet and tech companies such as Google, Amazon, Microsoft, and Verizon,
who joined U.S. delegation in Dubai for U.N. treaty talks).
55. This can be illustrated by looking to the Fair Labor Association’s Board of Directors.
Board of Directors, FAIR LABOR ASSOCIATION, http://www.fairlabor.org/about-us/board-directors
(last visited Feb. 17, 2014). About one-third of the board consists of corporate representatives.
56. Alvarez, supra note 27 at 5; see also Advisory Committee, BETTER WORK, http://better
work.org/global/?page_id=352 (last visited Feb. 17, 2014) (Better Work is a partnership program
between the International Labour Organization (ILO) and International Finance Corporation (IFC)
which works to improve compliance with labor standards and global supply chain competitive-
ness. Better Work provides a list of global advisory committee members from various enterprises
and organizations who guide Better Work’s management group on “the overall Better Work ef-
fort, specifically with regard to strategic directions, strategic partnerships and key developments in
the areas of global supply chain management and labour standards.”).
57. Alvarez, supra note 27, at 6.
58. See, e.g., Katharina Kummer Peiry, Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. OF INT’L L. 5, http://
legal.un.org/avl/ha/bcctmhwd/bcctmhwd.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2014) (The Basel Protocol
“regulates civil liability for damage resulting from the transboundary movement of hazardous
wastes and other wastes, including incidents occurring as a result of illegal traffic.”).
59. See U.N. Security Counsel Report, Special Research Report: UN Sanctions, Nov. 25,
2013, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/special-research-report/un-sanctions.php.
60. Id.
61. For example, Sunco became the first Fortune 500 company to sign on to the Ceres Princi-
ples thereby pledging to adopt environmentally sound practices. The Ceres Principles were devel-
oped in the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. See Matthew L. Wald, Company News:
Corporate Green Warrior; Sun Oil Takes Environmental Pledge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1993,
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3. Participants and Power
The impasse between positivists and progressive positions on the ques-
tion of corporate personality points to the importance of pursuing alterna-
tive ways of approaching the conceptual and concrete problems associated
with aggregations of private power. All progressive attempts to impose
binding legal obligations on private commercial actors at the international
level have, to date, failed. The positivist position, to the extent that it sup-
ports the position that private commercial actors have no obligations under
public international law, does little to address atrocities and provide those
injured by private commercial actors with remedy. As a result, some schol-
ars and jurists have called for international law to be re-conceptualized.
Early in the subject/object personality debates, Jessup proposed that
international law be defined not only “as law applicable to states in their
mutual relations and to individuals in their relations with states,” but also
extend “to certain interrelationships of individuals themselves, where such
interrelationships involve matters of international concern.”62 Comple-
menting Jessup’s concerns, more recently Dame Rosalyn Higgins has urged
international lawyers to reject their common conceptions of “subjects” and
“objects,” warning of the risks of constructing “an intellectual prison” that
could come to serve as an “unalterable constraint.”63 Higgins would substi-
tute “participants” for the “subjects” and “objects,” a pragmatic approach
that could potentially bypass the impasse.64 Alvarez posits: “[c]alling a cor-
porate entity a ‘subject’ or ‘object’ of international law confuses more than
enlightens.”65 Indeed, newly adopted international norms (discussed infra)
take a pragmatic approach that does not engage the subject/object
discussion.
To clarify and enlighten understandings of subject/object duality in in-
ternational law and how it serves to impact access to remedies for human
rights violations and the development of ethical business cultures, it is in-
structive to review the evolution of the corporate form and the role of com-
merce in the international arena.
II. EMPIRE AND THE EVOLUTION OF GLOBAL ENTERPRISE
There are competing accounts of when the antecedent to the modern
multinational corporation first came into existence. Discussions of early
corporate formations have taken one of two approaches, one emphasizing
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/02/11/business/company-news-corporate-green-warrior-sun-oil-
takes-environmental-pledge.html.
62. Jessup, supra note 26, at 385.
63. Alvarez, supra note 27, at 8 (citing ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 49 (1994)).
64. Id. (citing HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT
50 (1994)).
65. Alvarez, supra note 27, at 8.
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merchants engaged in trade and exchange, the second emphasizing
merchants sharing and structuring profits and losses to regulate risk.
A. Early Origins and the Evolution of the Multinational Corporation
1. The Ancient Era-Assyrian Exchange
As far back as 3000 B.C., business transactions in Mesopotamia tran-
scended simple bartering.66 The Sumerian communities trading along the
Tigris and Euphrates rivers had attempted to normalize property ownership
through written contractual arrangements.67 Then, religious institutions
served as regulator and financier.68 The temple served the function of both
bank and state overseer.69 As long ago as 2000–1800 B.C., the Assyrians
pioneered partnership agreements for financing that possessed features
common to the current structure of venture capital funds.70
As the Phoenicians and Athenians extended their trading efforts into
maritime commerce around the Mediterranean Sea, formal trading arrange-
ments became increasingly important.71 In contrast to trade over land, the
expense and uncertainty of overseas trading set a higher incentive for the
creation of institutional structures to entice investment.72 Because maritime
commerce needed a way to overcome the “danger for investors and credi-
tors alike, that a sea captain would simply disappear,” the Athenian model
relied on rule of law to structure investment and remained small in scale.73
As the Roman Empire grew, so did societates. A “more ambitious”
form of organization than the Athenian model, societates were created to
facilitate the Empire’s ability to collect revenues.74 The societates were en-
trusted to Roman knights in partnership with the nobility.75 As the taxes
levied across the realm became too much of an administrative burden for
the nobility to manage alone, the societates served to aid the process.76
These firms of nobles and knights played a central role as the “commercial
arm of conquest, grinding out shields and swords for the legions.”77 Be-
neath the nobility and knights on the Roman socioeconomic scale,
66. JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY OF
REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 3 (2003) (citing JONATHAN BARRON BASKIN & PAUL J. MIRANTI, A HIS-




70. Id. (citing KARL MOORE & DAVID LEWIS, FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE EMPIRE 33
(2001)).
71. Id. at 3–4.





77. Id. (citing KARL MOORE & DAVID LEWIS, FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE EMPIRE 97
(2001)).
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merchants and craftsmen came together in collegia or corpora—a form of
guild with the power to license members of a particular trade—the corpora
elected its own management.78
William Blackstone, the renowned eighteenth-century jurist, credited
the Roman Empire with inventing the basic corporate form.79 Core concepts
of corporate law that persist in the present find their roots in the Roman
Empire. For example, the concept of collective identity distinct from con-
stituent individual members was a feature of commercial enterprises operat-
ing during the Roman Empire.80 “The Romans linked companies to the
familia, the basic unit of society.”81
In addition to allowing for the existence of a distinct corporate iden-
tity, Roman forms of business organization also separated ownership from
operations.82 The partners, or socii, entrusted managerial decisions to a
magister.83 The magister directed operations, supervised agents and man-
aged accounts keeping tabulae accepti et expensi.84 Despite this relatively
solid evolving structure, most contracts that were created were of only a
short duration.85 Most wealth remained concentrated in private estates or
agriculture and was not jointly shared.86
After the fall of Rome, the East enjoyed commercial ascendance.
Trade grew across the Islamic world, India, and China.87 In 1066, “Chinese
factories were producing 125,000 tons of iron a year—a figure Europe
would not match for seven hundred years.”88 The Chinese pioneered paper
money to facilitate trade.89 China reached the zenith of its economic imperi-
alism in the fifteenth century, when the Ming Emperor Yung Lo’s fleet of
ships dominated Asia.90 After his death in 1424, China’s mercantilist explo-
ration was abandoned by his successor.91 Later emperors rebuilt trade rela-
tions but ambitions were limited and there was not much enthusiasm for
trade with Europe.92 One Chinese emperor reportedly sent a message to
Britain’s George III in 1793: “‘As your ambassador can see, we possess all
things . . . . There is therefore no need to import the manufactures of outside
78. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 66, at 4 (citing A.H.M JONES, THE ROMAN




82. Id. at 4–5.
83. Id.
84. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 66, at 5.
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing RICHARD DUNCAN-JONES, THE ECONOMY OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE: QUANTITA-
TIVE STUDIES 33 (1977)).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 5.
90. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 66, at 6–7.
91. Id. at 7.
92. Id.
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barbarians in exchange for our own produce.’”93 John Micklethwait and
Adrian Wooldridge have argued that China’s fortunes changed with respect
to its relative power in the region and the world because it failed to evolve
or adopt the corporate form of business organization.94
2. Medieval Merchants and Guilds
Jurists of the Medieval Age interpreted Roman and Canon law to allow
the recognition of “corporate persons”—associations of individuals who
wished to be treated as collective entities. These early corporate persons
were not limited to commercial enterprises. Rather, “[h]ouseholds, guilds,
universities, Inns Of Court, convents, charitable foundations and cities were
among the early medieval corporations.”95 Scholars have traced the lineage
of the corporation to Pope Innocent IV, a thirteenth-century canonist.96
During this time “the corporate concept was in large measure the hand-
maiden of institutionalized religion.”97 The corporation was most often
used as a legal means by which small collectives of individuals committed
to education, charity, or religious devotion, such as a university or an abbey
could ensure continued existence and possession of property and legal
rights after the death of its membership.98 The Medieval Corporation essen-
tially offered community and a protected procedural mechanism for the
transmission of wealth and customs to future custodians of the collective.
The merchant empires of southern Europe and the guilds and state-
chartered corporations of northern Europe were the dominant medieval cor-
porate forms.99
In Southern Europe the compagnia evolved in twelfth century Florence
from family firms sharing joint liability.100 In Latin compagnia means
“breaking bread together.”101 Trust was at a premium among members of
the firm because bankruptcy could be punished by imprisonment or inden-
tured servitude.102 Since liability was shared with partners responsible for
one another’s debts, most were close knit and short term. Northern Euro-
pean merchants adopted several of the structures started by the Italians.103
93. Id.
94. Id. at 6.
95. McLean, supra note 49, at 364.
96. Sigmund Timberg, The Corporation as a Technique of International Administration, 19
U. CHI. L. REV. 739, 739 (1951).
97. Id. at 739. See also John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personal-
ity, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 663–66 (1926) (discussing how the struggle between church and state
affected perceptions of legal institutions such as corporations).
98. Timberg, supra note 96, at 739.
99. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 66, at 7.
100. Id. at 8.
101. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 12.
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The growing popularity of the corporate form in northern Europe did
attract the attention and anxiety of the Crown. By virtue of enjoying an
immortal status in law, corporate organizations presented a challenge:
“[t]hey circumvented feudal fees by never dying, never coming of age, and
never getting married.”104 Edward I, King of England, acted to regulate
corporations by limiting the amount of land permitted to pass to corporate
bodies.105 Nevertheless, corporations continued to grow in popularity.
The most significant form of commercial association in the medieval
era, however, was the guild. Medieval guilds exercised a monopoly on trade
within a city’s walls. The city sovereign received funds from guilds for
granting trade monopolies. Because guilds operated without competition,
some commentators have argued: “The guilds were often more like trade
unions than companies, more interested in protecting their members’ inter-
ests than pursing economic innovation.”106
Regulated companies of the period were associations of independent
merchants that were granted monopolies of trade over foreign markets.
They were similar to guilds in that they trained apprentices prior to mem-
bership and screened membership for quality. Regulated companies, unlike
guilds, cooperated to negotiate better prices for raw materials.107 Regulated
companies’ profits were entangled with the interests of the sovereign. For
example, the Staple of London, founded in 1248 acquired the right to col-
lect customs on wool exports in exchange for financing Edward III’s French
Wars.108 Later, Henry VI granted the company authority over Calais.109
Medieval corporations were not the spontaneous, voluntary, aggre-
gated natural persons that would later dominate the era of European expan-
sion overseas. The form was not frequently used for business purposes.
More favored were partnerships. It would be the overseas ambitions of the
countries of northern Europe that would solidify the form as the colonial
project was pursued for profit.
B. Imperialist Expansion and the Charter Company
The economics of empire building and territorial expansion further re-
fined the structure of the corporate form. Commerce played a central role in
the colonial confrontation. Colonialism played a significant role in shaping
commerce through creating markets for shares and incentives to develop
stable corporate governance. Not unlike the societates of the Roman Em-
pire, charter corporations served as the “commercial arm of conquest.”110
104. Id. at 12–13.
105. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 66, at 13.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 13–14.
108. Id. at 14.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 4, 17.
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While some commentators point to the imperial period and the power pri-
vate corporations assumed as anomalous,111 it is an instructive era for un-
derstanding contemporary framing of the public/private divide as it informs
the subject/object distinction that complicates the question of the applica-
tion of the law of nations to corporations. The distinction drawn between
public and private power has come to inform sovereignty doctrine and as-
sessments of whether entities operating globally are properly viewed as
subjects or objects of international law and the rights entities possess and
the responsibilities entities must bear. The global commerce conducted by
charter corporations during the Age of Empire can be understood as the
antecedents of today’s modern multinational. Conquest through commercial
actors enriched Europe often at the expense of the populations of the for-
eign territories brought under the control of European sovereigns. The for-
eign territories that were under colonial control are now the developing
nations of today’s era of globalization. Many ATS actions involving alleged
abuses by modern multinational actors originate in regions explored and
exploited by charter companies. The legacy of the colonial charter corpora-
tions is therefore important to examine.
1. Charter Companies, the Power of the Crown and Colonial
Projects
Charter corporations were enterprises operating with the express au-
thority of the sovereign, the crown royalty. From the sixteenth to nineteenth
century, the Crown exercised exclusive authority over incorporation.112 Ac-
cordingly an explicit, ex ante, authorization from the Crown was required in
order for an association of individuals to incorporate.113 Authorization took
the form of charters or letters of patent.114 In rare instances, authorization
was granted by parliamentary action with the consent of the Crown.115
A grant of the privilege of incorporation was premised on the condi-
tion that every aspirant to corporate status convince the Crown or Parlia-
ment that if awarded a charter the corporation would fulfill a “public
purpose.”116 The late sixteenth century marked the first time “the corporate
form was used in risky ‘for profit’ ventures.”117 In the same period, Europe
was engaged in imperial expansion. European nations embarked upon con-
verting the competitive advantage of their sea dominance and power to con-
trol shipping routes into profits for merchants and funding for ruling
111. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 66, at 20–21.
112. RON HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND BUSINESS OR-
GANIZATION, 1720-1844 17–18 (2000).
113. Id. at 17.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. McLean, supra note 49, at 375 (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. Id. at 365.
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monarchy through various colonial projects. Commercial activities of char-
ter corporations overseas advanced the public purpose of conquest and
served to expand and strengthen European rule over large parts of the
Americas, Asia, and Africa. McLean says, “[i]n the first two decades of the
seventeenth century, some forty companies were granted trading monopo-
lies by their respective governments over much of the known world.”118
Until the late sixteenth century, businesses were mostly comprised of
partnerships, but Europe’s colonial expansion contributed to the elevation
of the corporate form. In the enterprise of building Europe’s empire the
corporate form became preferable to partnership.119 The corporate form
proved the structure best suited for mediating the high risks associated with
for-profit activities of the period primarily as overseas trade and explora-
tion. Because the risks associated with foreign ventures were high, at-
tracting investors required protection and incentives. The grant of
monopoly provided some measure of protection.
Not only were early colonial era charter companies granted exclusive
monopolies by their respective home countries over the country’s trade in
overseas territories, they also were vested with sovereign powers according
to the terms of their charters which defined the scope of their operations.120
The sovereign powers of a corporation could be altered or amended by ap-
plication to the Crown.121 McLean writes, “[t]he acquisition of an overseas
territory by a trading corporation, vested with sovereign powers, automati-
cally transferred feudal conceptions of ownership of land and governance
over British subjects in that territory.”122
These early global enterprises served the project of empire. Among the
most powerful seventeenth-century charter corporations engaged in colonial
projects were the Hudson’s Bay Company, the London and Plymouth com-
panies in the Americas, the Royal African Company on the African Conti-
nent, and the East India Company in Asia.123
The Hudson’s Bay Company was granted a charter in 1670 to locate
the northwest route to the Pacific, to occupy territory and to conduct any
commerce viable in the terrain. The company engaged in the fur trade for
the first two hundred years of its existence. It also engaged in armed con-
flict with French interests. The company lost its monopoly in 1859 and
independent fur traders competed in the trade. In 1870 the company sold its
territories, virtually all of present-day Canada to the Canadian government.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 365–67.
121. Id. at 367.
122. McLean, supra note 116, at 367.
123. Id. at 365; S. R. H. Jones & Simon P. Ville, Efficient Transactors or Rent-Seeking Mo-
nopolists? The Rationale for Early Chartered Trading Companies, 56 J. ECON. HIST. 898, 898
(1996).
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The Company received title to one-twentieth of the lands of western Canada
along with mineral rights on the land. The Company still operates, active
now in merchandising, real estate, and natural resources; it is the oldest
incorporated joint-stock company in the English-speaking world.124
Created by the Charter of Virginia granted by King James I in 1606,
the London and Plymouth companies enjoyed sovereign powers in the pre-
sent-day United States.125 The London Company also owned a larger por-
tion of Atlantic and inland Canada.126 The London Company was granted
authority to create settlements in the Americas.127 The Plymouth Company
shared permission to settle the region as well.128 The Crown set the condi-
tion that neither company would found a colony within one hundred miles
of one another.129
Both the London and Plymouth companies were by charter “empow-
ered to fortify territory, coin money, and impose customs duties.”130 Set-
tlers to territory without corporate consent could be expelled.131 Pursuant to
Charter terms, territory was held by the companies “of the king under the
assumption that they formed part of an English manor.”132 Private inves-
tors—also known as “adventurers”—purchased shares, which in turn fi-
124. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 66, at 17; see “Hudson’s Bay Company,”
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/274735/Hudsons-
Bay-Company (last visited Feb. 5, 2014) (offering a brief history of the Hudson’s Bay Company);
see also Alex Ross, The Records of the Hudson’s Bay Company Land Department, 1879-1963, 22
ARCHIVARIA 114 (1986) (evaluating the fate of the early Hudson’s Bay Company records as many
were lost or had not been preserved); Our History: Business: Fur Trade: The Deed of Surrender,
HBC, http://www.hbcheritage.ca/hbcheritage/history/week/the-deed-of-surrender (last visited
Feb. 5, 2014) (reviewing how the Hudson’s Bay Company developed, specifically through the
Deed of Surrender); Our History: Overview, HBC, http://www.hbcheritage.ca/hbcheritage/history/
overview.asp (last visited Feb. 5, 2014) (providing an overview of the trading activities the Hud-
son’s Bay Company provided in the Great Lakes region and Canada); Ann M. Carlos & Stephen
Nicholas, Agency Problems in Early Chartered Companies: The Case of the Hudson’s Bay Com-
pany, 50 J. ECON. HIST. 853, 860 (1990) (arguing the Hudson’s Bay Company overcame many
problems other chartered companies faced by implementing strategies to encourage actions that
served the company’s goals).
125. DARRELL J. KOZLOWSKI, KEY CONCEPTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY: COLONIALISM 40–41,
69–70 (Jennifer L. Weber ed.) (2010); Justin Corfield, Company Profiles: North America, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BUSINESS IN TODAY’S WORLD 333, 333 (Charles Wankel ed., 2009).
126. EDWARD D. NEILL, HISTORY OF THE VIRGINIA COMPANY OF LONDON WITH LETTERS TO
AND FROM THE FIRST COLONY NEVER BEFORE PRINTED 3–4 (1869) (“The company under charter
was divided . . . the First Colony . . . [could] begin their first plantation at any point in Virginia
between the thirty-fourth and forty-first degrees or north latitude, while . . . the Second Colony . . .
[could] plant between the thirty-eighth and forty-fifth degrees of the same latitude”).
127. Id.
128. See id. (discussing the “Virginia Company,” collectively referring to London Company
and Plymouth Company).
129. JOSEPH R. CONLIN, THE AMERICAN PAST: A SURVEY OF AMERICAN HISTORY 29–30 (8th
ed. 2009).
130. McLean, supra note 49, at 366.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 366 (quoting M.F. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD
TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (1926)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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nanced overseas settlements. The enterprise possessed both public and
private features. The Plymouth Company’s fortunes fell after its settlement
was abandoned. The Virginia Charter was later revised to grant the London
Company exclusive rights.133 The London Company would cultivate to-
bacco as a cash crop from 1612 until 1624, when the company lost its char-
ter, and Virginia, the territory it settled, became a royal colony.134
King Charles issued a charter in 1660 that granted a monopoly over
English trade with West Africa to the Company of Royal Adventurers Trad-
ing to Africa.135 Initially authorized to mine and trade gold and other pre-
cious minerals, its successor enterprise would diversify into trading
slaves.136 The company incurred an unbearable debt burden after losing a
war it instigated against the Netherlands when it waged an armed campaign
against Dutch African trading posts.137 The company restructured, becom-
ing the Royal African Company in 1672.138 Under the new charter, the
company’s powers were expanded. It was authorized to construct forts, to
raise and maintain an armed military force and impose and enforce martial
law to pursue trade in gold, silver, and slaves.139 The new company would
over the course of its monopoly over the slave trade make 249 trips trans-
porting up to ninety thousand slaves between 1672 and 1689.140 The slave
trade proved profitable for England.141 Other merchants challenged the
company’s monopoly and pressured Parliament to open trading to all in
1698.142 After Parliament opened slave trading to all, the company eventu-
133. 2 BENSON J. LOSSING, HARPERS’ POPULAR CYCLOPAEDIA OF UNITED STATES HISTORY
FROM ABORIGINAL PERIOD TO 1876 806 (1881).
134. Teresa Potter, Relatedness and Mortality Among the Jamestown Colony Settlers 16
(Aug. 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Utah) (on file with author); NEILL,
supra note 126, at 416–419; see also LOSSING, supra note 133, at 805–06 (providing historical
background of the Virginia Company governing the colonists where each had the right of certain
property sections until the revocation of the charter).
135. K.G. DAVIES, THE ROYAL AFRICAN COMPANY 38, 97–101 (1957).
136. Id. at 98; McLean, supra note 49, at 365 n.8 (“it held a monopoly over the British slave
trade between West Africa and the West Indies. ‘Free’ trade in slaves came in 1712 and from then
until 1759 the company ran coastal forts for the British government.”).
137. GEORGE FREDERICK ZOOK, THE COMPANY OF ROYAL ADVENTURERS TRADING INTO AF-
RICA 20–21 (1919).
138. W. R. Scott, The Constitution and Finance of the Royal African Company of England
from Its Foundation Till 1720, 8 AM. HIST. REV. 241, 244 (1903).
139. Id. at 244–45; FRANK KITSON, PRINCE RUPERT: ADMIRAL AND GENERAL-AT-SEA 237–38
(1998).
140. London and Transatlantic Slave Trade, PORT CITIES UK, http://www.portcities.org.uk/
london/server/show/ConNarrative.103/chapterId/2252/outputFormat/print/London-and-the-trans
atlantic-slave-trade.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2014); The Terrible Transformation: Royal African
Company Established, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part1/1p269.html (last visited Feb. 6,
2014).
141. See generally Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, in RACE AND RACIALIZATION: ES-
SENTIAL READINGS (Tania Das Gupta et al. eds., 2007).
142. Scott, supra note 138, at 247 (1903); Jones & Ville, supra note 123, at 903; Royal Afri-
can Company Established, in Africans in America, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part1/
1p269.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2014).
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ally abandoned slave trading in 1731 in favor of ivory and gold.143 In 1752
the company dissolved to be succeeded by the African Company of
Merchants.144
The East India Company was granted its charter from Queen Elizabeth
I in 1600.145 The charter awarded the company a monopoly over all British
trade east of the Cape of Good Hope at the southernmost tip of Africa.146
Initially formed to engage in the spice trade, it would end its days as an
agent of British imperial power in India.147 The company raised funding for
each voyage east through selling shares in each particular voyage.148 Later,
it would fund the entire venture.149 The early English East India Company,
in existence from 1600 to 1708, encountered opposition to its monopoly
from other merchants.150 Monopoly opposition led to the establishment of a
rival company.151 The two companies were combined in 1708 to form the
United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies.152 The
new entity was organized into a body of twenty-four directors working
through committees elected annually by the Court of Proprietors, or
shareholders.153
Through a combination of commerce and conquest the combined com-
pany would come to rule over large portions of the Indian sub-continent
recognized as “the richest jewel in the imperial crown.”154 The company
brought under British control wealth in excess of the colonial adventures of
Spain and France combined.155 Colonizing India through the company’s
efforts, imperial Britain obtained control over twenty million new subjects
143. Harvey M. Feinberg & Marion Johnson, The West African Ivory Trade during the Eight-
eenth Century: The “. . . and Ivory” Complex, 15 INT’L J. AFR. HIST. STUD. 435, 444 (1982).
144. Matthew David Mitchell, “Legitimate Commerce” in the Eighteenth Century: The Royal
African Company of England Under the Duke of Chandos, 1720–1726, 14 ENTER. & SOC’Y 544,
576 (2013).
145. Nick Robins, Loot: In Search of the East India Company, the World’s First Transna-
tional Corporation, 14 ENV’T & URBAN., 79, 80 (2002).
146. Id. at 81; Emily Erikson & Peter Bearman, Malfeasance and the Foundations for Global
Trade: The Structure of English Trade in the East Indies, 1601–1833, 112 AM. J. SOC. 195, 200
(2006).
147. Miles Ogborn, Writing Travels: Power, Knowledge, and Ritual on the English East India
Company’s Early Voyages, 27 TRANSACTIONS OF THE INS. OF BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 155, 158
(2002); H.V. BOWEN, THE BUSINESS OF EMPIRE: THE EAST INDIA COMPANY AND IMPERIAL BRIT-
AIN, 1756–1833, 29–30 (2006); see also Gary M. Anderson & Robert D. Tollison, Adam Smith’s
Analysis of Joint-Stock Companies, 90 J. POL. ECON. 1237, 1253 (1982).
148. LEWIS H. HANEY, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND COMBINATION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
EVOLUTION AND NATURE OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND A TENTATIVE
SOLUTION OF THE CORPORATION AND TRUST PROBLEMS 43 (2003).
149. Id.
150. K.N. CHAUDHURI, THE TRADING WORLD OF ASIA AND THE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COM-
PANY 1660–1760 44 (1978).
151. Id.
152. See MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 66.
153. See id. at 24.
154. BOWEN, supra note 147, at 1.
155. Id. at 5.
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and their labor and seventy million acres of land, both cultivated and uncul-
tivated.156 With a population of approximately forty million, 65 percent of
people in the British Empire were Indian.157
The Dutch East India Company secured a monopoly from the state in
1602 and became the model for all chartered firms.158 In contrast to the
English East India Company, which initially treated each voyage as a sepa-
rate venture with different investors, the Dutch Company made all voyages
part of a single venture over a term of years.159 The Company’s investors
enjoyed limited liability.160
In operation, the charter authority exercised by these trading compa-
nies of adventurers and explorers carried forward a concept of sovereignty
from the feudalism of the medieval era that did not have a developed dis-
tinction between public and private. This conceptual arrangement served
both the Crown and commercial actors. The Crown could tap charter corpo-
rations as a source for public financing and raise revenue without Parlia-
ment. The Crown could extend its influence overseas with the costs of
exploration, conquest and settlements funded by corporations. The corpora-
tion could enjoy monopoly power over the ability to profit from overseas
exploration and exploitation. To fund exploration the corporation sold
transferable shares, promising to divide profits among its shareholders.
2. Managing the “Mediate Sovereigns”
As European society changed from a feudal system, power dynamics
in society changed. The role of the corporation and its relationship to the
sovereign were also altered over the period of social transformation. Con-
cepts antecedent to sovereignty evolved to serve alternatively the interests
of the Crown and the interests of charter corporations as the relationship
between public authority, private ownership, and profits was mediated be-
tween European centers of power. Attitudes towards power and which enti-
ties could exercise power evolved.
The imperial era charter corporations had a profit purpose but also
performed public services in terms of financing the foreign policy interests
of the Crown. Expansive authority granted by charter and a lack of division
between sovereign power and private ownership meant that often “the costs
of embassies, overseas representatives, fortifications, and sometimes, even
wars, would be borne by the corporations themselves.”161 Charter compa-
156. Id.
157. Id. (citing PATRICK COLQUHOUN, A TREATISE ON THE WEALTH, POWER, AND RESOURCES
OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE . . . 7, 61 (2d ed., 1815).
158. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 66, at 20.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. McLean, supra note 49, at 365.
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nies like Hudson Bay and London were important instruments in the British
settlement and colonization of North America.162
The new territories settled by charter corporations were still, as in the
medieval era, closely “identified with the private property of the monarch
of the state.”163 In medieval times, the rights of the people who lived and
worked on the land were derived from the exclusive ownership of the Lord.
This feudal framework laid the foundation for the concept that the Crown,
through its agent the charter corporation, could acquire territory accompa-
nied by sovereignty overseas.
The shared sovereignty arrangement was possible because the antece-
dent of the modern concept of sovereignty (imperium) and the antecedent of
the modern concept of private ownership (dominium) were understood as
combined.164 Imperium entailed the exercise of authority over people.165
The power of imperium was the power to control people and require their
adherence to rules set by the ruling authority.166 Dominium entailed the
exercise of control over property.167
The business of building enterprise was based on the charter corpora-
tion’s exercise of the power of imperium on behalf of the Crown. British
corporations were vested with sovereign powers to the extent set forth in
their charters. Corporations could further expand their power and authority
through application to the Crown. Applying the chess analogy offered by
Timberg to determine on which side of the subject/object line in interna-
tional law that an entity with global reach falls, charter corporations were
more like chess players than chess pieces in the Age of Empire. Commer-
cial actors assumed sovereign functions and exercised authority over those
within the domain delineated by their charters.
This sovereign power sharing agreement was enforced by the risk that
the Crown could revoke or refuse to renew a corporation’s charter.168 The
combination of the imperium and dominium concepts operated largely to
the benefit of the Crown in the seventeenth century. The Crown was able to
capture and settle territory through its corporate agents because the “acqui-
sition of an overseas territory by a trading corporation, vested with sover-
eign powers, automatically transferred feudal conceptions of ownership of
land and governance over British subjects in that territory.”169 Feudal links
extended to overseas territories. The settlements that were created by char-
ter companies were deemed subject to the sovereign rule of the Crown.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 366 (quoting 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 545 (H. Lauterpacht ed.,
8th ed. 1955)).
164. Id. at 366.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. McLean, supra note 49, at 366.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 367.
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The delegation of authority from a European state sovereign made the
difference between lawful and unlawful acts on the sea and overseas. Janet
McLean offers the following analysis of piracy and the public-private di-
vide that demonstrates this point:
Trade was closely connected to the law of the sea. . . . Pirates
were unlawful, yet privateers were a lawful institution. The priva-
teer was a commander of a private commercial ship who was au-
thorized by the state to participate in “armed commercial
ventures” by letters of marque from the King or Admiralty. Pi-
rates were considered criminals or outlaws. Privateers, on the
other hand, performed important public services when they inter-
cepted ships, seized their cargos, and aided naval blockades.170
In the seventeenth century, the presence of delegated authority from
the sovereign was the primary point of distinction between the lawful con-
duct of a privateer and the unlawful conduct of a pirate, even if actions were
the same in kind. The eighteenth century saw a decoupling of imperium and
dominium such that the symbiotic relationship between the Crown and
charter companies as the overseas trade monopoly system declined.171 Sev-
eral of the early companies failed.172 There were political struggles between
the Crown and Parliament over authority to grant the privilege of
incorporation.173
The nineteenth century brought a return to colonial expansion through
the trading company form but with imperium and dominium increasingly
divided conceptually. Charter corporations alternatively emphasized or
downplayed the extent of sovereign status to avoid obligations and amass
greater influence.174 For example, the East India Company would empha-
size its sovereign status to avoid contractual debts to local rulers abroad
while in Britain relying on the advantage of the military power of the royal
navy but resisting any recognition of the royal navy to the extent it would
diminish perceptions of the company’s power by locals overseas.175
In light of this evolution in corporate identity and relationship to soci-
ety, John Westlake, writing in the early twentieth century, has described the
status of trading enterprises in the late nineteenth century as “mediate sov-
ereigns.”176 This ambiguity allowed the creation of informal empire instead
of formal empire. As McLean has argued, the ambiguous status of the char-
170. Id. at 366–67.
171. Id. at 367 (citing RON HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 1720–1844, at 58 (2000)).
172. Id. at 368.
173. McLean, supra note 49, at 368.
174. Id. at 369.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 370 (quoting JOHN WESTLAKE, THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN WESTLAKE ON
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 196–97 (L. Oppenheim ed., 1914)).
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ter corporation continued to serve the interests of the chartering state.177
Treating corporations as private entities possessing ownership privileges
only “had the effect of portraying the colonial encounter as an encounter
between ‘equals.’”178 In this way, charter company trade in foreign territo-
ries became, “a pure and liberal endeavor as compared with the more ex-
pensive and already sometimes odious practices of colonization.179
Consequently, informal empire was often preferred to formal empire.”180
The establishment of public imperium and private dominium as sepa-
rate concepts in international law had implications for the legal personality
of corporations. Now understood to be private actors possessing in law only
powers associated with ownership and not those powers associated with
imperium or sovereign rule, the colonial encounter was reconceived as not
exchanges between nation states but rather interactions among private trad-
ers.181 As a result, instead of international law applying to the conduct of
commercial actors: “a separate flexible law of nations developed: not a uni-
versal law of nations but a separate French, English, or German colonial
law” preventing the extension of the concept of sovereignty to colonial
territories.182
The legal nature of corporations was not determined by international
law. Instead, national law or colonial law governed the status of different
corporations with varying results. French law, for instance, forbid the dele-
gation of sovereignty to private entities, while other countries favored such
delegation.183 Although international lawyers of the period, like today’s
progressive legal scholars, advanced the position that corporations should
be treated as subjects of international law, ultimately the positivist position
that corporations were agents of their state of incorporation prevailed.184
Inconsistencies between the law of nations and the local corporations law
has left a legacy that continues to confound today, as demonstrated by fed-
eral court decisions that split between positivists and progressive ap-
proaches in answering the question of whether corporations can be liable
for violations of the law of nations.185 Power asymmetries persist between
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. McLean, supra note 49, at 370–71.





185. For examples of more positivist approaches, see Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388 (4th
Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of ATS action); Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, 643
F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that while ATS does allow claims over corporations, plaintiffs
did not satisfy the requirements that violations have occurred); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc.,
197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999) (affirming motion to dismiss claims under ATS); Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (concluding that
customary international law rejects corporate liability); Abagninin v. AMVAC Chem. Corp., 545
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developing countries and the foreign companies active in emerging market
economies.
C. The Evils of Colonialism, the End of Empire, and the Rise of Social
Expectations
As the dominant form of organization for building empire, the charter
corporation flourished. As the power of charter corporations grew and their
interests appeared to come into conflict with those of the Crown, the for-
tunes of charter corporations changed. Various actors in society questioned
the growing dominance of the charter corporation and challenged the in-
creasing influence of the newly affluent class of colonial merchants. The
way in which the English East India Company used and abused its power
raised questions and eventually attracted public outcry. Often credited as
the “mother of the modern corporation,” the East India Company over its
274 years in existence managed to “[bridge] the mercantilist world of
chartered monopolies and the industrial age of corporations accountable
solely to shareholders.”186 Therefore, it provides an interesting and impor-
tant example for examining the role of private commercial actors in a global
economy in an international order organized around the sanctity of the sov-
ereignty of the nation state.
Questions over the proper role of charter corporations increased as
they prospered economically and exerted greater political influence. Public
debates over the power exercised by the English East India Company cap-
tured the changing attitudes in society towards charter corporations, and to
a lesser degree, the colonial project. Not unlike the opposition large corpo-
rations like Wal-Mart encounter today, in Imperial England there were con-
cerns over how the manner in which a large commercial actor conducted
business would affect society. Nick Robins offers an apt summation of how
the East India Company was situated in British society at the zenith of its
power: “East India House lay at the heart of both the economy and govern-
F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that a chemical manufacturer was not a state actor or a state-like
organization for purposes of international law or crimes against humanity under ATS). For exam-
ples of more progressive approaches, see Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(establishing that corporations are not immune from liability under the ATS); Sarei v. Rio Tinto,
PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 748 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Rio
Tinto PLC v. Sarei, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013) (“We therefore address the scope of liability for
private actors, including corporate liability, with respect to those claims we conclude can allege a
violation of a sufficiently established international norm. There is no legitimate basis for Rio
Tinto’s position that the statute itself is a complete bar to corporate liability.”); Baloco ex rel.
Tapia v. Drummond Co., Inc., 640 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding plaintiffs had “adequately
pled a cause of action cognizable under the ATS.”); Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579
F.3d 943, 956 (9th Cir. 2009) on reh’g en banc, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that ATS
claims were valid despite  defense relying on state secrets doctrine).
186. NICK ROBINS, THE CORPORATION THAT CHANGED THE WORLD: HOW THE EAST INDIA
COMPANY SHAPED THE MODERN MULTINATIONAL 5 (2006) [hereinafter THE CORPORATION].
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ance of Britain, a monstrous combination of trader, banker, conqueror and
power broker.”187
The proper mix of functions for the colonial era charter companies was
contested from the early days of the form. Adam Smith in The Wealth of
Nations argued that the role of trader and sovereign were incompatible.188 It
was for a time presumed that commercial actors were traders first, with
responsibility for territorial rule a distant second.189 After some time and
the revelation of atrocities, excesses and corrupt conduct it became increas-
ingly difficult to deny that East India Company employees were no longer
mere merchants but rather had become de facto emperors of Britain’s ex-
tended reign over the far reaches of the realm.190
As its influence over the Indian subcontinent grew, criticism of the
East India Company’s inability to act in a manner befitting sovereign power
also increased. As early as 1615, British commentators expressed concern
as the Company had to be reminded of its obligations to comport with the
aspirations of the nation.191 At the height of its power the British East India
Company “ruled over one-fifth of the world’s people, generated a revenue
greater than the whole of Britain and commanded a private army a quarter
of a million strong.”192 The Company enriched Britain but impoverished
India.193 The Company’s excesses in India in no small part contributed to
the ultimate demise of the enterprise and of Britain’s ability to exercise
imperial power.
In 1757 the Company acquired Bengal through the efforts of a small
private army led by Robert Clive who defeated the Nawab of Bengal in the
Battle of Plassey near the trading base of Calcutta (Koltata).194 After the
victory, the company installed a puppet government and systematically
looted the treasury of Bengal.195 By 1778 the Company dominated Euro-
pean trade with Asia, displacing the Dutch.196 The Company’s profits
soared.197 When the Company assumed authority over the Diwani, a tax
187. Robins, supra note 145, at 83.
188. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
343–44 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1977) (“No two characters seem more inconsistent than those of
trader and sovereign. If the trading spirit of the English East India Company renders them very
bad sovereigns, the spirit of sovereignty seems to have rendered them equally bad traders. While
they were traders only, they managed their trade successfully . . . . Since they became sover-
eigns . . . they have been obliged to beg the extraordinary assistance of government in order to
avoid immediate bankruptcy.”).
189. McLean, supra note 49, at 368.
190. BOWEN, supra note 147, at 3, 9–10.
191. McLean, supra note 49, at 368–69 (citing THEODORE K. RABB, ENTERPRISE AND EMPIRE,
MERCHANT AND GENTRY INVESTMENT IN THE EXPANSION OF ENGLAND 39–40 (1967)).
192. Robins, supra note 145, at 79.
193. Id.
194. BOWEN, supra note 147, at 3; THE CORPORATION, supra note 186, at 2–3.
195. BOWEN, supra note 147, at 3–4; THE CORPORATION, supra note 186, at 3.
196. THE CORPORATION, supra note 186, at 2–3.
197. Id.
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collected from the ten million residents of Bengal, it essentially came to
control the entire public financing of an overseas territory.198
What followed the Company’s conquest of Bengal was the oppression
of local residents and labor. During periods of drought and famine, the
Company profiteered on food prices.199 By some estimates, between one
and ten million inhabitants of the area perished from starvation.200
The Company’s activities in India had influence on trade across the
British Empire. For example, “A terrible triangle was formed with African
slaves being purchased in part with Indian cotton goods, then being sold in
the Americas for new-mined gold and silver, which in turn found its way
via London to India where it procured more textiles.”201 The money made
in Bengal enabled the company to triple the funding devoted to its tea trade
in China as tea consumption in Britain increased.202 As demand for tea
increased so did the desire to trade with China.203 The Company facilitated
the export of opium produced in Bengal to China and later financed the
Opium Wars precipitated by China’s efforts to reject opium.204 The Com-
pany’s tea trade would also come to symbolize oppression in America. The
Boston Tea Party, the symbolic start to America’s Revolutionary War, was
a protest over the influence the East India Company exercised.205
Back home on British soil, the corrosive effects of the East India Com-
pany continued as the wealth obtained by company members found its way
into politics. The newly wealthy as a result of the Company’s exploits in
India created a new class called “Nabobs” (an uncomplimentary derivation
from the Hindi word nawab).206 Nabobs drew scorn from the existing aris-
tocracy for purchasing places in society.207 The Nabobs would come to hold
one-tenth of the seats in Parliament.208 Accordingly, attempts to intervene
in the Company’s affairs could cause the fall of governments because the
Company enjoyed significant influence in the Parliament. It was not until
broader public sentiment turned against the Nabobs as “unease about events
in India interacted with concerns about recurring financial crisis to cause
reform, regulation and control” that the Company’s power in the govern-
ment began to wane.209
198. BOWEN, supra note 147, at 3–4, 10.
199. Robins, supra note 145, at 84.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 80–81.
202. THE CORPORATION, supra note 186, at 3–4.
203. Robins, supra note 145, at 81.
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205. Id. at 82.
206. Id. at 83.
207. Id.
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209. BOWEN, supra note 147, at 1.
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Nabob excesses also drew scrutiny outside of an envious aristocracy.
Members of the faith-based community, such as the Quaker William Tuke,
drew attention to the Company’s abuses in India and the humanitarian con-
sequences of the way the Company conducted business.210 By the 1790s it
was feared that allegations of corruption and greed against company ser-
vants would besmirch the national character of the British as Nabobs, who
had become known as ruthless profiteers.211 Nabobs were satirized as vul-
gar nouveaux riches with ill-gotten gains that they expended on tasteless
consumption and accumulation.212 During this same period the Company
became embroiled in debates over slavery when Elizabeth Heyrick
launched the first consumer boycott against the Company.213 She persuaded
her fellow citizens in Leicester to stop buying “blood-stained” sugar from
the West Indies.214 Because of the boycott, the Company was eventually
forced to get its sugar from sugar producers in Bengal.215
Pamphleteers of the 1830s denounced British politicians who allowed
“a gigantic power to exist in opposition to the welfare of the Kingdom.”216
It became increasingly clear to observers from the scale of the Company’s
corruption that the government exercised only “feeble and indirect con-
trol.”217 As one commentator warned: “Were it not, indeed, that the locality
of its wealth is at so remote a distance, the very existence of [such] a body
would be so dangerous, not merely to the liberty of the subject, but to the
stability of the state.”218
Efforts to regulate the Company’s excesses were eventually successful,
culminating in the India Act of 1784. The Act transferred management of
the Company’s Indian affairs to a Control Board required to report to Par-
liament.219 The legal reforms led to the creation of a new governance
structure.
III. INCORPORATING RIGHTS
In the transition from the Age of Imperialism to the Industrial Age, the
shared sovereignty arrangement between the Crown and corporate actors
that accelerated global economic expansion changed. Concerned segments
of society on both sides of the Atlantic opposed the public-private partner-
ship between the Crown and charter corporations to enrich the nation at the
expense of oppression, particularly the oppression and abuses associated
210. Robins, supra note 145, at 83.
211. BOWEN, supra note 147, at 15.
212. Id.
213. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 66, at 27.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. BOWEN, supra note 147, at 16 (internal citation omitted).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 17 (quoting Anon., The session of Parliament for MDCCCXXV 42 (1825)).
219. Id. at 73.
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with the trade in African slaves.220 In the economic globalization of the
present era, as was the case during the Age of Empire, the perceived ex-
cesses of industry and association of commercial activity with rights abuses
has led to pressure for change. Today, large multinationals like Wal-Mart
confront criticisms not unlike those leveled against the East India Company
of a bygone era. Understanding the abolitionist advocacy of the past era is
important for appreciating the business and human rights initiatives in oper-
ation today and the social movements seeking to create a more ethical busi-
ness culture that are generating new norms for corporate conduct.
A. Social Pressure and Social Change: From the Abolitionist Example
to Building Safety in Bangladesh
Scholars Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink have explored the im-
pact of advocacy networks on international politics, and they argue that
transnational networks have in fact influenced international relations.221
According to Keck a “transnational advocacy network” is “a set of relevant
organizations working internationally with shared values, a common dis-
course, and dense exchanges of information.”222
The effort to end the transatlantic slave trade provides an instructive
case in point of a transnational advocacy network that succeeded in its aim
by using strategies that remain effective and in use in modern social move-
ments. Human rights activists and socially responsible investors, in coali-
tion with communities affected by alleged abuses involving corporate
conduct in developing countries, have deployed some of the same strategies
used by the abolitionist movement to confront entrenched economic inter-
ests and end slavery.
The success of the abolitionist movement and the short duration of the
effort relative to the long-standing social institution it aimed to end are
often underappreciated. Historian Eric Fogel has argued: “It is remarkable
how rapidly, by historical standards, the institution of slavery gave way
before the abolitionist onslaught, once the ideological campaign gained mo-
mentum.” Indeed, due in significant part to the efforts of a transnational
advocacy movement opposed to slavery and the slave trade, “‘within the
span of little more than a century, a system that had stood above criticism
for 3,000 years was outlawed everywhere in the Western world.’”223
220. JENNY S. MARTINEZ, THE SLAVE TRADE AND THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW 17 (2012); see also MICHAEL CRATON, SINEWS OF EMPIRE: A SHORT HISTORY OF
BRITISH SLAVERY 247–60 (1974) (summarizing the opposition to the slave trade and events lead-
ing up to abolition).
221. MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998).
222. Id. at 46.
223. Id. at 41 (quoting ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL, WITHOUT CONSENT OR CONTRACT: THE RISE
AND FALL OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 204–05 (1989)).
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Historians, political scientists, and economists have debated whether
the end of slavery was due to economic or moral pressure. More recent
research has concluded that economic factors alone do not explain the de-
mise of slavery.224 For instance, Fogel has established that the economics of
slavery show it was “‘profitable, efficient, and economically viable in both
the U.S. and the West Indies when it was destroyed.’”225 He argues that the
end of the trans-Atlantic slave trade was nothing short of “an act of ‘econo-
cide.’”226 How was eradication of the trade and emancipation of slaves
accomplished?
More recent research findings suggest that “the impetus behind aboli-
tion was primarily religious and humanitarian” rather than economic pres-
sure that forced change.227 According to Fogel, the death of slavery was “a
political execution of an immoral system at its peak of economic success,
incited by men ablaze with moral fervor.”228
The antislavery movement started with efforts to abolish the slave
trade before seeking emancipation for the enslaved.229 Quakers in Penn-
sylvania were the first to organize opposition to slavery as a social institu-
tion in the 1680s.230 The first real sustained movement against the practice
started in 1787 when British abolitionists launched a public campaign
against the slave trade.231 The movement was maintained until the emanci-
pation of slaves in Brazil in the 1880s.232
British merchants and capital were heavily involved in the slave trade.
Abolitionists therefore began to challenge commercial actors at the origin
of the movement.233 Working to oppose entrenched and powerful economic
interests required that abolitionists devise strategies to raise consciousness
and create concern over the slave trade among a significant portion of the
British public. Abolitionists waged their campaign to end the trade on mul-
tiple fronts. According to Keck and Sikkink, the single most important tac-
tic of the abolitionist movement was its adept deployment of “information
politics.”234
224. Id. at 42.
225. Id. (quoting ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL, WITHOUT CONSENT OR CONTRACT: THE RISE AND
FALL OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 410 (1989)).
226. Id.
227. KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 221, at 42.
228. Id. (quoting ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL, WITHOUT CONSENT OR CONTRACT: THE RISE AND
FALL OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 410 (1989)).
229. Id. at 41.
230. Id. at 41 n.3 (citing ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL, WITHOUT CONSENT OR CONTRACT: THE
RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 205 (1989)).
231. Id. at 41.
232. Id. (citing ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL, WITHOUT CONSENT OR CONTRACT: THE RISE AND
FALL OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 204–05 (1989)).
233. KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 221, at 41
234. Id. at 45.
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Information politics was the deliberate practice of sharing stories and
stating the facts concerning the human costs incurred by those enslaved.
The contribution of the transnational abolitionist movement’s use of infor-
mation politics in its campaign to end the slave trade was its ability to pro-
vide a ‘language of politics.’ The language of information politics
developed by abolitionists provided organizational structures and a tactical
playbook for allied campaigns in other nations.235 For example, abolition-
ists in Britain and the United States created networks of local, regional, and
national antislavery organizations.236 These organizations “frequently ex-
changed letters, publications, and visits.”237 Over time a transnational advo-
cacy network emerged and profited from the exchange of information:
Antislavery groups in the US and Britain borrowed tactics, orga-
nizational forms, research, and language from each other. They
used the tactics of the petition, boycotts of slave-produced goods,
and hired itinerant speakers very successfully on both sides of the
Atlantic. Many of these tactics originated in Britain and the trans-
national network served as a vehicle for diffusing tactical recipes
and collective action repertoires from one domestic social move-
ment to another.238
First abolitionists exposed the atrocities associated with the trade
through fact reporting. The publication of American Slavery As It Is: Testi-
mony of a Thousand Witnesses would make salient the suffering of slaves
and the evils of the institution of slavery.239 The book was compiled from
testimonials and contained extensive clippings from Southern newspapers.
As It Is is an early example of the enduring method still used by the human
rights and other social movements of “reporting facts and dramatic use of
personal testimony to give facts meaning and motivate action.”240 Cultivat-
ing awareness of the atrocities associated with slavery through arts and
literature would eventually reach a wider audience. Harriet Beecher Stowe’s
then popular and now classic novel Uncle Tom’s Cabin relied on As It Is.241
In 1853 Stowe published a defense of Uncle Tom’s authenticity as a work
of fiction based in fact—the facts and information available in the publica-
tions of earlier abolitionists that documented abuses.242
235. Id. at 43.
236. Id. at 44.
237. Id. (citing ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL, WITHOUT CONSENT OR CONTRACT: THE RISE AND
FALL OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 212, 217, 227 (1989)).
238. Id. at 45.
239. KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 221, at 45; THEODORE DWIGHT WELD, AMERICAN SLAVERY
AS IT IS: TESTIMONY OF A THOUSAND WITNESSES (1839).
240. KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 221, at 45.
241. Id. at 47; HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM’S CABIN (1852).
242. KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 221, at 47.
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The abolition movement also made use of petitions.243 In Britain, ap-
proximately four hundred thousand individuals signed petitions opposing
the nation’s involvement in the slave trade.244 In 1791 and 1792, one out of
every eleven adults had signed a petition opposing the trade.245 By 1814
one of every eight adults had signed an anti-slavery petition. In 1833 one of
every seven adults—twice the number of voters in British elections—had
signed petitions in favor of the emancipation of slaves.246 The movement
managed to shift public perceptions of the slave trade and slavery.247
Abolitionists also gathered to organize and share information with one
another. There were world antislavery conferences in London in 1840 and
1843. Technological advances of the era enabled activists to spread their
message to allies across the sea more quickly. Activists in the abolitionist
movement shared strategies and even speakers. Transportation allowed
greater exchange. For the British abolitionists intent on eradicating the prac-
tice, “America was no longer a distant land: it was only two weeks
away.”248
According to Keck and Sikkink, British campaigns to end slavery and
the slave trade shaped the politics of the Civil War.249 The movement mo-
bilized British public opinion against slavery and prevented the British gov-
ernment from recognizing the rebel South. Abolitionist opposition to
slavery in the United States also informed the British government’s deci-
sion to refrain from intervening in the conflict between the North and the
South.250 British intervention could easily have swayed the war outcome to
the advantage of the South.251 However, “[t]he Emancipation Society’s
campaign helped mobilize British public opinion in favor of the North, con-
vincing leaders that any policy that appeared to favor the slave states would
243. Some current day examples of activist movements and petitions resisting corporate
power include Occupy Wall Street, see, e.g., OCCUPY WALL STREET, http://occupywallst.org (last
visited Feb. 21, 2014) (“fighting back against the corrosive power of major banks and multina-
tional corporations”); anti-tobacco campaigns, see, e.g., Challenge Big Tobacco, CORPORATE AC-
COUNTABILITY INTERNATIONAL, http://www.stopcorporateabuse.org/campaigns/challenge-big-to
bacco (last visited Feb. 21, 2014) (supporting the “unanimous adoption of the global tobacco
treaty, the first global public health and corporate accountability treaty.”); and a current petition
against Samsung and its connection to Chinese labor practices, see Samsung: stop exploiting child
labor, CHANGE.ORG, http://www.change.org/petitions/samsung-stop-exploiting-child-laborers (last
visited Feb. 21, 2014) (calling on Samsung to stop exploiting child laborers through its Chinese
employers).
244. KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 221, at 44.
245. Id.
246. Id. (citing ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL, WITHOUT CONSENT OR CONTRACT: THE RISE AND
FALL OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 212, 217, 227 (1989)).
247. Id.
248. Id. (citing DOUGLAS CHARLES STANGE, BRITISH UNITARIANS AGAINST AMERICAN SLAV-
ERY 1833-65 96 (1984)).
249. Id. at 51.
250. KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 221, at 51.
251. Id.
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be divisive and unpopular.”252 Even though British economic interests were
more aligned with the South and “Southern leaders believed that the British
textile mills’ dependence on Southern cotton would force the British gov-
ernment to recognize and support the Confederacy,” the British remained
out of the conflict.253
Arguments against British “intervention” in U.S. affairs were ad-
vanced on the other side of the Atlantic as well. American commentators
argued that because the British did not understand the domestic institutions
of the United States, therefore the British should not intervene in American
affairs. American pro-slavery commentators contested British opposition to
slavery as an unwarranted attack on practices and customs of the country
particularly as other abuses elsewhere in other countries were being over-
looked by the British such as polygamy in Turkey.254 It was also argued
that Britain would do well to look within its own borders for abuses against
the poor. Indeed, pro-slavery forces in the United States argued also that the
condition of the lower classes in England was “far inferior to that of Ameri-
can slaves.”255
The politics of the movement did at times appear inconsistent. For ex-
ample, “[a]bolitionists in Britain often combined antislavery principles with
support for British imperialism. They believed that imperialism would
spread Christianity, Westernization, and the benefits of trade, and ingenu-
ously saw no contradiction among these principles.”256
Moreover, “[m]ost antislavery activists were not willing to extend their
efforts to the cause of ‘wage slavery’ in either country.”257 Indeed, Garrison
maintained it was “an abuse of language to talk of the slavery of wages” for
in effect it would equate bondage with liberty: “to say that it is worse for a
man to be free, than to be a slave, worse to work for whom he pleases,
when he pleases, and where he pleases.”258 Accordingly, “[b]y focusing on
power only in this juridical form, however, as a system of restraints and
restrictions, antislavery discourse naturalized or made unproblematic ‘free’
labor, ignoring the role of power in market and labor relations.”259
Although abolitionists did not draw a connection between poor labor
conditions and slave or forced labor, some governments and social activists
252. Id.
253. Id. at 50. See also, BRIAN JENKINS, BRITAIN AND THE WAR FOR THE UNION 5 (1974).
254. KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 221, at 42 (citing DOUGLAS CHARLES STANGE, BRITISH
UNITARIANS AGAINST AMERICAN SLAVERY 1833-65 63, 73, 84 (1984)).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 77 (citing MICHAEL CRATON, SINEWS OF EMPIRE: A SHORT HISTORY OF BRITISH
SLAVERY 293 (1974); ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL, WITHOUT CONSENT OR CONTRACT: THE RISE AND
FALL OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 388 (1989)).
257. KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 221, at 77.
258. Id.
259. Id. (citing ERIC FONER, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR 70
(1981)).
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today oppose human trafficking for the purpose of forced labor as a form of
modern day slavery.260 Information politics is being used to elevate con-
sumer and investor consciousness about weak links in the global supply
chains where rights violations are rife. As their predecessors in the aboli-
tionist movement, contemporary human rights activists also use strategies
calculated to raise awareness about abuse by reporting facts and docu-
menting violations. Today religious and humanitarian groups are engaged
in shareholder and other activism against abuse by businesses of human
rights. With the benefit of more advanced technologies of information ex-
change such as the Internet and the information communications technology
of social media, social movements are able to reach more people more
rapidly.
The recent deaths of thousands of Bangladeshi workers in multiple
factory fires and the collapse of the Rana Plaza manufacturing complex
offer a contemporary example of cultivating consciousness of the human
costs of consumer goods to create change and promote corporate social re-
sponsibility.261 Arguably, failure to respect the rights of workers to associ-
ate and organize contributed to the unsafe working conditions that allowed
the tragedies to occur. Transnational advocacy networks coordinated to ar-
ticulate and amplify demands for better working conditions.262 Non-govern-
mental organizations in the United States and Europe mobilized to raise
awareness of the tragedy and staged protests outside of popular consumer
260. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 7 (2013) (quoting
President Barack Obama on human trafficking: “It ought to concern every person, because it’s a
debasement of our common humanity . . . the outrage, of human trafficking, which must be called
by its true name – modern slavery.”); the organization Anti-Slavery International works to elimi-
nate slavery around the world and considers trafficking for the purpose of forced labor a form a
modern slavery, see What is Modern Slavery?, ANTI-SLAVERY, http://www.antislavery.org/eng
lish/slavery_today/what_is_modern_slavery.aspx (last visited Feb. 21, 2014); the Polaris Project,
named after the North Star “Polaris” used as a guide by slaves escaping slavery in the Southern
United States to travel North along the Underground Railroad, works to end human trafficking and
modern day slavery through advocacy and education, see Human Trafficking, POLARIS PROJECT,
http://www.polarisproject.org/human-trafficking/overview (last visited Feb. 4, 2014).
261. See, Julfikar Ali Manik, Steven Greenhouse & Jim Yardley, Western Firms Feel Pres-
sure as Toll Rises in Bangladesh, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/
26/world/asia/bangladeshi-collapse-kills-many-garment-workers.html?pagewanted=all; Steven
Greenhouse, Some Retailers Rethink Role in Bangladesh, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2013, http://www
.nytimes.com/2013/05/02/business/some-retailers-rethink-their-role-in-bangladesh.html; but see,
Jim Yardley, Clothing Brands Sidestep Blame for Safety Lapses, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2013, http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2013/12/31/world/asia/garment-makers-stumble-on-call-for-accountability
.html; Steven Greenhouse & Jim Yardley, As Walmart Makes Safety Vows, It’s Seen as Obstacle
to Change, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/29/world/asia/despite-
vows-for-safety-walmart-seen-as-obstacle-to-change.html?pagewanted=all; Editorial, Ban-
gladesh’s Clothing Industry: Bursting at the Seams, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2013, http://www.econ-
omist.com/news/business/21588393-workers-continue-die-unsafe-factories-industry-keeps-boom
ing-bursting-seams.
262. Syed Zain Al-Mahmood & Christina Passariello, Bangladesh Victims Demand Payback,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230406960457
9153553776683312.
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clothing brands that sourced from Bangladesh.263 The news media pub-
lished accounts and images of the tragedy that were widely disseminated
through social media.264 In response to public outcry, coalitions of private
corporations (primarily large popular retail brands sourcing from the coun-
try) created compensation funds and codes of conduct to regulate safety
standards in the local companies manufacturing goods for export to western
markets.265 The United States government threatened to withdraw trading
privileges enjoyed by Bangladesh.266 Recently, Bangladesh announced re-
forms to its labor law that will allow workers to organize.267
B. International Initiatives to Address Alleged Rights Abuses by
Business Enterprises
It was the work of civil society movements that placed business and
human rights on the global policy agenda. Non-governmental human rights
and faith-based organizations in cooperation with affected communities
263. See, e.g., Editorial, Bangladesh’s Workers Deserve Better, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/19/opinion/bangladeshs-workers-deserve-better.html (reporting
on meetings convened by labor unions and anti-sweatshop organizations); Editorial, Fed Up in
Bangladesh, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/26/opinion/fed-up-in-
bangladesh.html?_r=0 (reporting on worker street protests in Bangladesh).
264. Stories about the factory conditions in Bangladesh in the aftermath of the fires and build-
ing collapse were published in multiple major international media outlets with links to social
media sharing sites including Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and Pinterest. See, e.g., Syed Zain Al-
Mahmood, Bangladesh Factory Fire Puts Renewed Pressure on Clothing Firms, THE GUARDIAN,
May 10, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/09/bangladesh-factory-fire-clothing-
firms (British news report).
265. See Katerina Sokou, Major U.S. Retailers Work Jointly to Improve Factory Safety in
Bangladesh, WASH. POST, July 10, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/ma
jor-us-retailers-join-to-improve-factory-safety-in-bangladesh/2013/07/10/350d0690-e977-11e2-
aa9f-c03a72e2d342_story.html; Steven Greenhouse, $40 Million in Aid Set for Bangladesh Gar-
ment Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/24/business/interna
tional/40-million-in-aid-set-for-bangladesh-garment-workers.html; Steven Greenhouse & Stepha-
nie Clifford, U.S. Retailers Offer Plan for Safety at Factories, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2013, http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/business/global/us-retailers-offer-safety-plan-for-bangladeshi-fac
tories.html; Steven Greenhouse, Major Retailers Agree to Inspection Standards in Bangladesh,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/21/business/international/major-re
tailers-agree-to-inspection-standards-in-bangladesh.html; Shelly Banjo, Wal-Mart, Gap Press for
Safety in Bangladesh, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142
4052702304402104579151942188514188.
266. See Steven Greenhouse, Obama to Suspend Trade Privileges with Bangladesh, N.Y.
TIMES, June 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/business/us-to-suspend-trade-privile
ges-with-bangladesh-officials-say.html?pagewanted=all; Steven Greenhouse, U.S., Urging
Worker Safety Outlines Steps for Bangladesh to Regain its Trade Privileges, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/20/business/global/us-urging-worker-safety-outlines-
steps-for-bangladesh-to-regain-its-trade-privileges.html.
267. See, e.g., Agence France-Presse, Bangladesh Plans Stronger Labor Reforms After U.S.
Move, INDUSTRY WEEK, July 7, 2013 http://www.industryweek.com/trade/bangladesh-plans-
stronger-labor-reforms-after-us-move; Maya Saini, Headway Seen in Bangladesh on Safety Re-
form, WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY, May 7, 2013; Editorial, Halfhearted Labor Reform in Bangladesh,
N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/18/opinion/halfhearted-labor-re
form-in-bangladesh.html.
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have worked to increase awareness of the impact of business on human
rights.268 Their efforts have attracted the attention of global policy makers
and have contributed to the creation of new principles to inform business
practices that impact human rights.
The Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General
for Business and Human Rights crafted Guiding Principles for the Imple-
mentation of the U.N. “Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework” after
consultation with a broad range of stakeholders in civil society.269 The
Guiding Principles offer prescriptive guidance to States and businesses, and
clarify the roles and responsibilities of each as to three core principles: (1)
the duty of states to protect against human rights abuses by third parties,
including business enterprises; (2) the duty of corporations to respect
human rights by avoiding infringing on others’ rights and to redressing ad-
verse impacts; and (3) access to judicial and non-judicial remedies for vic-
tims.270 The Guiding Principles offer both foundational and operational
guidance to corporations concerning human rights duties.271
Taken together the foundational principles and the operational princi-
ples contained in the Guiding Principles articulate the obligations corpora-
tions have to respect human rights and how to fulfill them.272 The
responsibility to respect as a matter of foundational principle further re-
quires that corporations “seek to prevent or mitigate adverse impacts that
are directly linked to their operations, products, or services by their business
relationships, even if they have not contributed to those impacts.”273 A cor-
poration’s “business relationships” extends to associations with partners
whether non-state or state. Indeed, much of the litigation against corpora-
268. See, e.g., Bylaws, INTERFAITH CENTER ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY June 23, 2010,
http://www.iccr.org/about/By-LawsFINAL062310.pdf (providing the organization’s purpose “to
further the mission of religious organizations in the areas of corporate responsibility, social re-
sponsibility in investment and social and economic policy, and to further interfaith cooperation in
these areas.”); Business and Human Rights, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, http://www.amnesty.org/
en/business-and-human-rights (last visited Feb. 21, 2014) (“Through research and analysis, Am-
nesty International aims to highlight human rights abuses in which companies are implicated and
how governments fail to prevent these abuses or hold companies to account when they occur.”);
About, HUMAN RIGHTS ACTION CENTER, http://www.humanrightsactioncenter.org/dyr/about/ (last
visited Feb. 21, 2014); Mission Statement, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/about
(“Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around the
world. . . . We challenge governments and those who hold power to end abusive practices and
respect international human rights law.”).
269. Rep. of the Special Representative of the Sec’y Gen., Protect, Respect, and Remedy: a




272. See Rep. of the Special Representative of the Sec’y-Gen., Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Frame-
work, 13–22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (March 21, 2011), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Docu
ments/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf.
273. Id. at 14.
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tions concern claims of complicity or aiding and abetting and involves acts
that could be attributed to a corporation’s partners or issues that flow from
particular business relationships.
In addition to setting forth these foundational norms, the Guiding Prin-
ciples also offer operational guidance for business enterprises on how to
fulfill their responsibility to respect human rights.274 In order to prevent,
mitigate, and address human rights impacts the Guiding Principles state that
corporations should establish a human rights due diligence process to assess
their actual and potential effects to operationalize the responsibility to re-
spect human rights.275
The U.N. Framework provides a relatively clear explanation of what it
expects companies to do for due diligence. It explains that corporations
must “consider three sets of factors” when doing their due diligence: (1)
corporations must “highlight any specific challenges they may pose” in the
countries where they have business activities; (2) corporations must deter-
mine the “human rights impact” of their own activities; and (3) corporations
must determine “whether they might contribute to abuse through the rela-
tionships connected to their activities,” such as partners, suppliers, and state
agencies.276 The U.N. Framework lists basic components that a human
rights due diligence process should contain. These basic components in-
clude policy implementation, impact assessment, policy integration, and
performance tracking.277 Additionally, the Guiding Principles elaborate on
specific procedures that companies can follow to satisfy their due diligence
responsibility.278
Some human rights campaign groups have expressed disappointment
that the Framework and Guiding Principles did not go further in creating
binding obligations for corporations and regret that the international com-
munity has failed to produce a legally binding framework for ensuring ac-
countability.279 Proponents of the process that generated the Framework
and Guiding Principles point out that industry’s involvement indicates that
it is a pragmatic way of addressing the problems that concern campaign-
274. Id. at 15.
275. Id.
276. Special Representative of the Sec’y-Gen., Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework
for Business and Human Rights, ¶ 57, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) [hereinafter UN
Framework].
277. Id. at ¶¶ 60–64.
278. Special Rep. of the Sec’y-Gen., Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Im-
plementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, ¶¶ 16–21, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter UN Guiding Principles].
279. See, e.g., Joint Civil Society Statement on the draft Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights, FIDH, http://www.fidh.org/Joint-Civil-Society-Statement-on,9066 (last updated on
March 3, 2011).
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ers.280 While it is early to assess the likelihood of its success, the Frame-
work and Guiding Principles provide a salient starting point from which to
advance human rights and to put the issue of business practices that impair
the enjoyment of human rights on the public agenda.
C. Evolving Accounts of Corporate Identity and Responsibility
At the heart of questions concerning corporate identity and responsibil-
ity is power: how it is exercised and for what purpose. The demise of the
East India Company was due in part to perceptions concerning misuse and
abuse of power as it obtained more influence in society. Indeed, as Antony
Anghie has observed, “imperial projects inevitably provoke rebellion and
opposition.”281 The power of private commercial actors is similarly under
scrutiny. In international relations it is appreciated that “power may be
overcome by superior power or checked by an equivalence of power.”282
While transnational advocacy networks have nowhere near the same power
or wealth of major multinational corporations, they do have the potential to
change perceptions.
In today’s global economy there are increasingly multiple independent
and competing centers of influence. History teaches that in the future it will
be increasingly important to be flexible in fixing the legal personhood of
the corporation in international law but firm when the risk of abuse is high
and when harms happen.
The power to shift perception should not be underestimated by modern
multinational corporations as the success of the abolitionist movement
shows. Increasingly, when denounced by activists, multinational corpora-
tions distance themselves from association with violations.283 Having clari-
fied that states have the responsibility to protect human rights while
commercial actors also must respect those rights, new international norma-
tive regimes require corporations to be proactive in their business practices
to avoid directly or indirectly engaging in abuses.
280. See, e.g., John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International
Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT’L. L. 819, 838–39 (2007) (explaining efforts to increase the effectiveness
of the international human rights regime in addressing issues associated with a global economy).
281. ANGHIE, supra note 45, at 312.
282. JESSUP, supra note 1, at 18.
283. Many examples exist of corporations changing practices or distancing themselves from
violations in light of public fire. See, e.g., BUSINESS LEADERS INITIATIVE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COMPANIES TAKING A RIGHTS-AWARE
APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT, available at http://www.ihrb.org/pdf/BLIHR_Human_Rights_and_
MDGs.pdf (providing examples of various companies, including General Electric [changing its
after public criticism due to use of their ultrasound equipment in India to facilitate female infanti-
cide], and Coca-Cola [identifying potential responses to concerns of child labor during sugar cane
harvesting in El Salvador and supporting local solutions]). Another recent example is Apple join-
ing the Fair Labor Association, and attempting to resolve concerns over labor violations by some
of its factories in China. See, Sophia Yang, Apple Faces New China Labor Allegations, CNN
(Sept. 6, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/09/06/technology/apple-china-labor/.
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In some ways the new norms of business responsibility to respect
human rights is parallel to the past requirements imposed by the Crown as a
condition of granting the privilege of incorporation—that the corporation
serves a public purpose. Today all that is required to obtain a corporate
identity is to meet registration requirements in a given jurisdiction, yet
modern multinational corporations have broad impacts across multiple ju-
risdictions. Individuals concerned about or affected by corporate miscon-
duct are increasingly well positioned to demand change through the
creation of transnational networks. While a corporation may no longer be
required to make a compelling case to the Crown, increasingly a case must
be made to the community of stakeholders within its sphere of influence.
IV. CONCLUSION: EVOLVING CORPORATE OBLIGATIONS:
FROM THE CROWN TO THE COMMUNITY
This Article has explored how the history of colonialism has informed
the changing concepts of sovereignty and legal personality in ways that
could influence the performance of corporate responsibility and govern-
ance. While the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel signals that ATS litiga-
tion will likely no longer present the risks and costs it once did to
corporations with operations overseas, the social license to operate remains
a concern. Corporations should seriously consider what responsible conduct
must entail in different areas.  While the role of the corporation in the inter-
national arena has increased, so also has social transformation from the in-
dustrial age to the age of information promoted greater transparency. As
social transformation from the industrial age to the age of information has
promoted and permitted greater transparency, it is increasingly important to
understand the external impacts of conducting business in developing coun-
try economies where rights abuses or corruption are common features.
Greater transparency will make it more difficult for business enterprises to
conceal the negative external impacts of conducting business in challenging
contexts.
Anxieties over corporate power are not new but rather persist. This
Article has attempted to draw a line from past concerns to present ones as
pertains to the exercise of commercial power. As a practical matter, corpo-
rate social responsibility in the eyes of the public, if not the law, will be
treated as proportionate to the perceived power a corporate entity possesses.
Perhaps more than changes in law, whether sovereignty or shareholder pri-
macy are challenged, it could be changes in society that create incentives
for more ethical business cultures to emerge and inform future regulatory
efforts.
As demonstrated by the response of brand dependent businesses to the
public relations crisis that can result from the failure to avoid environmental
damage and involvement in rights abuses, consumer preference can be a
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powerful force. Consumer choices can change the way business is done.
Changing consumer choices will require social consciousness, access to in-
formation, and encouraging behavior that is consistent with social commit-
ments a class of consumers claim to hold. Transnational advocacy networks
could advance in the future, as did the abolitionist movement of the past.
Indeed, it could become the case that the stakeholder community of con-
sumers, social investors, and affected communities will in effect become
the new Crown, instead of a charter, issuing the social license to operate.
